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What Do Constitutions Say about 
Citizenship?
Citizenship	clauses	can	vary	in	interesting	
ways,	but	one	of	the	most	important	and	
characteristic	differences	has	to	do	with	jus 
soli	versus	jus sanguinis	provisions.		The	
provision	of	jus	soli (right	of	the	soil)	
entitles	those	born	in	the	territory	to	
citizenship,	while	jus	sanguinis (right	of	
blood)	entitles	those	with	national	
parentage.		The	division	of	jus	soli from	jus	
sanguinis makes	sense	historically,	since	
there	are	very	few	conditions	other	than	
blood	and	soil	that	have	alone	been	
sufficient	to	grant	citizenship.		Since	1789,	
43	percent	of	the	626	constitutions	in	our	
sample	have	offered	a	path	to	citizenship	in	
which	birth	in	territory	is	sufficient,	and	in	
42	percent	descent	alone	is	sufficient.		
Constitutions,	of	course,	can	provide	for	
both	paths:	almost	all	countries	that	offer	
jus	soli	(89	percent	of	jus	soli	constitutions)	
also	offer	jus	sanguinis.		Effectively,	then,	
the	question	is	whether	countries	offer	jus	
soli	or	not.		If	they	do,	we	can	think	of	
them	as	comparatively	inclusive.
Two	historical	facts	concern	us	here	
regarding	jus	soli.		First,	the	right	of	jus	soli	
is	in	relative	decline.		According	to	our	
data,	roughly	60	percent	of	constitutions	
throughout	most	of	the	1800s	provided	the	
right;	only	35	percent	do	so	now,	a	decline	
that	started	at	the	beginning	of	the	
twentieth	century.		Second,	a	large	majority	
of	constitutions	that	provide	(and	have	
provided)	the	right	are	from	the	Americas.
What	do	they	look	like?	Article	23	of	the	
Honduran	constitution	of	1982	is	typical	
of	the	unconditional	version	of	the	right:
Hondurans by birth are: 
 1.   Those born in national territory, except 
those of diplomatic agents 
fair	number	of	drafters	make	the	
distinction	between,	on	the	one	hand,	
nationals,	subjects,	and	“Brazilians”	(all	
understood	as	members),	and	on	the	other	
hand,	citizens	(members	with	voting	rights).	
Here	and	below	I	refer	to	data	that	I	have	
been	collecting	with	my	collaborators	on	
the	Comparative	Constitutions	Project.		
According	to	our	data,	about	one-fifth	(22	
percent)	of	the	world’s	constitutions	since	
1789	have	distinguished	between	the	two	
classes	(or	at	least	referred	to	both	terms).1		
Another	71	percent	of	constitutions	use	
either	“citizen”	or	some	variation	of	
“national/Brazilian”	(but	not	both	“citizen”	
and	“national/Brazilian”).		Generally,	those	
that	refer	to	citizens	without	mentioning	
nationals	(such	as	the	drafters	of	the	U.S.	
Constitution)	seem	to	mean	simply	
membership	in	the	state.		Citizens,	in	this	
non-Aristotelian	sense,	are	entitled	to	a	
passport,	but	they	may	not	be	entitled	to	
vote.		A	final	two	percent	of	constitutions	
use	the	term	“subject.”	Clearly,	this	term	is	
meant	to	refer	to	membership	only.		My	
concern	in	this	essay	is	simply	with	the	idea	
of	membership,	not	membership	with	
political	privileges.
Whether	it	is	about	citizens	or	nationals,	a	
discussion	of	some	class	of	national	identity	
is	one	of	the	few	topics	that	are	common	to	
nearly	every	constitution.		Roughly	96	
percent	of	constitutions	since	1789	say	
something	about	either	citizenship	or	status	
as	a	national,	and	a	full	70	percent	provide	
the	criteria	for	eligibility	for	one	or	the	
other	designations.		What	is	more,	fewer	
than	half	(44	percent)	of	those	
constitutions	that	do	not address	these	
criteria	include	a	clause	indicating	that	the	
criteria	are	to	be	specified	by	ordinary	law.		
These	latter	drafters	seem	to	acknowledge,	
perhaps	apologetically,	that	such	criteria	
are	something	that	readers	should	have	
expected	to	read	in	the	document.
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Some	of	the	most	intriguing	clauses	in	
national	constitutions	are	those	that	define	
the	nation	and	its	members.		I	mean	the	
kind	of	emphatic	statements	typically	
prefaced	by	the	stem	words,	“Brazilians	are	
those	who…,”	followed	by	a	host	of	
criteria.		Compared	to	other	sources	of	
national	identity,	these	clauses	are	not	
particularly	subtle.		Indeed,	it	is	hard	to	
imagine	a	more	prominent	source	(the	
constitution)	or	a	clearer	definition	of	
membership	than	these	provisions.		Of	
course,	the	purpose	of	these	citizenship	
clauses	is	to	bestow	membership	privileges	
on	some	but	not	others.		And,	just	as	
obviously,	these	clauses	can	vary	in	their	
exclusivity.		By	international	standards,	
citizenship	rules	in	Latin	American	
constitutions	have	historically	been	
remarkably	inclusive.		What,	if	anything,	is	
the	effect	of	such	inclusivity?		I	suspect	that	
this	citizenship	tradition	has	had	an	
appreciable	effect	on	the	degree	of	national	
unity.		
Clearing Some Conceptual Underbrush
Let	us	first	wrestle	to	the	ground	the	
concept	of	“citizen,”	as	well	as	its	
synonyms	and	its	related	terms.		The	
relevant	“semantic	field”	(Sartori	1984)	
includes	the	terms	“national”	and	“subject,”	
as	well	as	the	titular	designation	(e.g.,	
“Brazilian”)	and	its	equivalents.		A	basic	
distinction	has	to	do	with	whether	the	term	
refers	simply	to	membership	in	the	state’s	
community	or	to	something	more	than	
membership—membership	plus	some	set	of	
political	rights,	principally	voting	rights.		
The	latter	sense	is	what	Aristotle	had	in	
mind	by	politai,	which	is	often	translated	
as	“citizen”	in	English	and,	indeed,	has	
defined	that	concept	for	many.		
Many	constitutional	drafters	maintain	this	
Aristotelian	sense	of	the	term.		Actually,	a	
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Consequences
These	decisions	likely	have	real	
consequences,	some	welcome	and	some	
unwelcome.		One	could	argue	that	a	more	
demanding	set	of	citizenship	requirements	
might	lead	citizens	to	value	membership	
more,	an	attachment	that	could,	in	turn,	
imply	a	deeper	commitment	to	society	and	
participatory	governance.		Certainly,	those	
who	push	for	a	more	“consensual”	
(effectively	meaning	not	automatically	
granted)	citizenship	take	that	view	(Schuck	
and	Smith	1986).		
However,	there	is	another	consideration	
having	to	do	with	national	unity.		Citizens	
of	multiethnic	Latin	American	countries	
with	inclusive	citizenship	rules	tend	to	live	
together	in	comparable	harmony.		As	one	
indicator,	across	seven	multiethnic	
countries	in	Latin	America	included	in	the	
World	Values	Survey,	citizens	of	various	
ethnicities	express	the	same	high	level	of	
national	attachment	when	asked	to	respond	
to	survey	questions	such	as	“How	proud	
are	you	to	be	an	Brazilian?”	This	is	not	so	
in	other	countries.		Whatever	the	validity	of	
these	sorts	of	survey	items,	this	is	a	
remarkable	finding	that	deserves	further	
scrutiny.
It	is	hard	to	say	whether	jus	soli	has	
fostered	such	remarkable	unity	in	these	
countries	or	whether	other	correlated	
factors	are	more	relevant.		Still,	a	jus	soli	
effect	on	national	unity	makes	sense.		
Granting	membership	to	otherwise	
alienated	and	marginalized	individuals	and	
their	children	is	a	simple	but	fundamental	
gesture.		It	tells	the	individual	and	members	
of	their	ethnic	community	that—whatever	
perceived	and	real	ostracism	and	
discrimination	they	face—they	are	full-
fledged	members	of	society.		It	is	also	a	
gesture	that	validates	long-cherished	
principles	of	inclusion	and	opportunity.		As	
foreigners who are in Chile in the 
service of their government, and of the 
children of transient foreigners.  
However, all may apply for Chilean 
nationality.  
Common	law	is	thought	to	exclude	these	
categories	of	people	(diplomats,	transients,	
and	foreign	armies)	by	convention,	but	in	
fact	the	exact	conditions	attached	to	jus	
soli	are	at	the	heart	of	the	debate	over	
birthright	citizenship	in	the	United	States.		
There,	advocates	of	a	more	restrictive	
policy	have	pushed	a	limited	reading	of	the	
Fourteenth	Amendment	that	would	exclude	
children	of	undocumented	immigrants.		
Still,	these	various	examples	of	jus	soli	
provisions	put	the	Americas	in	stark	relief	
with	the	rest	of	the	world,	for	which	jus	
soli	is	no	longer	common.		
None	of	this	is	to	suggest	any	sort	of	
homogeneity	with	respect	to	citizenship	
clauses	in	the	Americas,	which	admittedly	
can	vary	substantially.		Consider	two	
contrasting	bookends,	Haiti	1805	and	
Bolivia	2009,	the	oldest	and	most	recent	
constitutions	from	the	region,	respectively.		
Contemporary	Latin	Americanists	will	be	
familiar	with	Bolivia’s	plurinational	
constitution	of	2009,	which	not	only	
invites	any	and	all	to	adopt	Bolivian	
identity	but	also	encourages	multiple	
national	identities.		Haiti’s	revolutionary	
constitution	of	1805	sets	a	startling	tone,	
though	in	keeping	with	its	revolutionary	
beginning:
Article 9: No person deserves to be a 
Haitian who is not a good father, good son, 
a good husband, and especially a good 
soldier.  
Article 11: Every citizen must possess a 
mechanic art.
 2.   Those born abroad of a Honduran 
mother or father 
 3.   Those born aboard boats and planes of 
Honduran nationality and those born 
aboard merchant ships in Honduran 
waters 
 4.   An infant of unknown parentage found 
in the territory of Honduras 
The	Honduran	law	gives	right	of	
membership	not	only	to	those	born	on	soil	
but	also	to	those	born	on	Honduran	sea	or	
air	(jus mari and	jus caeli,	perhaps)—an	
exceedingly	generous	version	of	jus	soli.		
On	the	other	hand,	some	jus	soli 
constitutions	require	a	period	of	residence	
prior	to	granting	membership	(call	this	jus 
soli et domicilium).		For	example,	Article	
22,	subsection	v	of	the	Portuguese	
constitution	of	1822	states:	
Portuguese citizens by birth include: 
 v.   The sons of a foreign father, who [the 
sons] are born and acquire residence in 
the kingdom and who upon gaining the 
age of majority declare that they wish to 
be Portuguese.  
This	version	of	jus	soli	is	similar	to	the	
current	law	in	Germany,	a	country	that	has	
long	been	associated	with	jus	sanguinis 
policies.		The	German	Nationality	Law,	as	
revised	in	2000,	allows	the	children	of	
legally	resident	immigrants	to	apply	for	
citizenship	by	their	twenty-third	birthday.		
More	commonly,	jus	soli policies	exclude	
those	working	in	the	diplomatic	corps	of	
another	country	and	those	in	transit,	as	in	
Article	10	of	Chile’s	1980	constitution:	
Chileans are: 
 1.   Persons born in the territory of Chile, 
with the exception of children of 
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terceros	países	u	organismos	
internacionales).		La	amplitud	de	estos	
objetivos	dificulta,	en	algunos	casos,	que	las	
instituciones	cumplan	con	unos	estándares	
mínimos	en	todas	estas	dimensiones	de	la	
calidad	de	la	democracia.		Pero,	a	la	vez,	
este	reto	apremia	y	anima	a	que	la	
academia	y	los	policymakers	continúen	su	
reflexión	sobre	el	funcionamiento	de	las	
instituciones	democráticas.		Aquí	se	
proponen	tres	ámbitos	de	estudio	que,	bien	
por	su	novedad,	su	impacto,	o	su	
desatención,	respectivamente,	reclaman	la	
atención	de	la	agenda	de	los	estudiosos	de	
las	instituciones.
En	primer	lugar,	el	intento	de	incorporación	
de	la	sociedad	civil	a	las	instituciones	de	
representación	constituye	una	novedad	que	
la	convierte	en	materia	de	análisis	obligado.	
Los	presupuestos	participativos	y	las	
revocatorias	de	mandato	entrarían	dentro	
de	esta	categoría	si	bien	con	resultados	
dispares	y,	en	lo	que	se	refiere	a	las	
revocatorias	de	mandatos,	generando	una	
gran	controversia.		Se	trata	de	un	
mecanismo	que	algunos	países	han	incluido	
para	destituir	a	las	autoridades	y	que	ha	
comenzado	a	ser	utilizado	en	el	ámbito	
local	(Argentina,	Colombia,	Ecuador,	Perú	
y	Venezuela	son	algunos	ejemplos	de	países	
con	esta	normativa).		El	espíritu	que	inspiró	
la	introducción	de	esta	figura	combinaba	el	
objetivo	de	adquirir	mayores	niveles	de	
accountability	y	de	prevención	de	abusos,	
así	como	el	acercamiento	de	la	política	al	
ciudadano.		Además	de	valorar	el	grado	de	
cumplimiento	de	estas	metas,	merecería	la	
pena	analizar	otros	daños	colaterales	como	
la	inestabilidad	política	que	pueden	generar,	
el	uso	de	recursos	desmedidos	para	
afrontar	coyunturas	electorales	adicionales	
y	sobrevenidas,	así	como	la	utilización	de	
dicha	figura	de	forma	interesada	por	parte	
de	algunos	grupos	de	poder	con	fines	no	
necesariamente	democráticos.		Hasta	la	
fecha	este	tema	ha	sido	abordado	
Se	ha	vuelto	una	rutina	afirmar	que	en	
América	Latina	las	instituciones	de	
representación	han	recibido	una	notable	
atención	desde	las	transiciones	y	
democratizaciones	que	comenzaron	treinta	
años	atrás.		No	es	tan	frecuente,	por	el	
contrario,	reconocer	que	en	el	proceso	de	
acumulación	de	conocimiento	ha	habido	
una	cierta	incapacidad	para	su	aplicación	
en	las	sucesivas	reformas.
Además	de	la	tendencia	a	las	“mesas	
separadas”	entre	académicos	y	
policymakers,	el	inevitable	
desacompañamiento	entre	la	realidad	y	su	
análisis	tampoco	ha	ayudado.		Un	ejemplo	
sirve	para	ilustrar	este	hecho.		La	crisis	de	
representación	que	el	mundo	andino	vivió	
en	la	década	pasada	apenas	había	sido	
anticipada	por	los	estudiosos	de	
instituciones.		Sin	embargo,	una	profunda	
reforma	de	las	instituciones	de	
representación	fue	uno	de	los	buques	
insignia	de	los	nuevos	gobiernos	de	
Ecuador	y	Bolivia.		Para	evitar	futuras	
faltas	de	anticipación,	es	necesario	un	
esfuerzo	sostenido	por	definir	una	agenda	
de	investigación	sobre	instituciones	actual	y	
relevante.	
Un	nuevo	eje	atraviesa	los	debates	sobre	
reformas	institucionales	pendientes	en	la	
región:	la	calidad	de	la	democracia.		Si	
trasladamos	la	concepción	de	calidad	de	la	
democracia	de	Levine	y	Molina	(2011)	al	
estudio	de	las	instituciones,	vemos	que	son	
varias	las	dimensiones	que	éstas	han	de	
perseguir.		En	este	sentido,	las	posibles	
reformas	habrán	de	profundizar	en	la	
consecución	de	instituciones	más	
participativas	e	inclusivas,	con	una	
composición	que	dependa	de	procesos	
electorales,	sometidas	al	control	ciudadano	
y	soberanas	con	respecto	a	presiones	
domésticas	de	grupos	variados	(como	los	
militares	o	grupos	económicos	del	país)	y	
externas	(como	las	que	puedan	ejercer	
constitutional	drafters	tinker	with	
citizenship	clauses,	the	relatively	costless	
benefits	of	inclusion	seem	worth	securing.
Endnote
1	 All	data	come	from	the	Comparative	
Constitutions	Project	(CCP).		At	this	point,	
CCP	investigators	have	examined	85	percent	
of	constitutional	systems	once	(i.e.,	by	one	
coder),	75	percent	twice	(by	two	coders),	and	
59	percent	three	times	(by	two	coders,	with	
any	discrepant	codings	reconciled	by	one	of	
the	principal	investigators).		In	this	paper	we	
use	cases	from	each	of	the	three	groups.		If	
there	are	cases	with	two	codings	that	have	not	
been	reconciled,	we	select	one	of	the	codings	
randomly.
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